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Introduction
Recently, the issues of immigration and immigration policy have gar-
nered intense debate in the United States.1 Much of what Americans have
discussed relates to border security, sanctions against employers who
knowingly hire undocumented workers,2 and temporary and permanent
paths to legalization for undocumented workers. 3 This debate often over-
shadows a meaningful discussion about the future of workplace rights for
undocumented workers who, despite their undocumented status, currently
work in the United States and at times suffer labor and employment law
violations in their workplaces. Unfortunately, the national immigration
debate has not incorporated this discussion. 4 Moreover, the current pro-
t Assistant Professor of Employment and Labor Law, Industrial and Labor
Relations School, Cornell University and 2005 Skadden Fellow. I would like to thank
Leslie Gates for her comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to acknowledge Aaron
Skrypski, Elizabeth Rabe, and the editorial staff of the Cornell International LawJournal
for their thoughtful feedback and able editorial support.
1. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Kennedy Plea Was Last Gasp for Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2007, at Al.
2. When I refer to "undocumented workers," I am referring to workers that do not
currently have legal authorization from the U.S. government to be physically present in
the United States.
3. See Raymond Hernandez, Opinions, Far Apart, Underscore Immigration Bill's
Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at BI.
4. For a recent and rare news editorial addressing the issue of labor standards
within the immigration debate, see Lawrence Downes, Editorial, Worker Solidarity
Doesn't Have to Stop at the Rio Grande, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 11.
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posed federal immigration bills neither address nor clarify what effect they
will have on the workplace rights of undocumented workers.
Similar to Professor Cunningham-Parmeter's article, 5 this article
focuses on one aspect of the new legal landscape for undocumented work-
ers in the United States since the U.S. Supreme Court's 2002 decision in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB. 6 One central element of this new
legal landscape is ongoing confusion about what effect, if any, immigration
policy has on federal and state labor and employment law7 in the United
States. Below, I take a first step toward clarifying the extent to which immi-
gration policy affects the rights of states to extend the full protection of
their state labor and employment laws 8 to undocumented workers. Specifi-
cally, I address the following unresolved question currently before many
lower courts: When, if ever, does federal immigration law preempt certain
state labor and employment law remedies? First, I briefly describe why
this question has emerged and has become important in U.S. courts. Next,
I describe recent U.S. Supreme Court Supremacy Clause jurisprudence
indicating that some lower courts' answers to the preemption question
described above threaten to stretch the Supremacy Clause beyond its con-
stitutionally-intended boundaries.
I. Emergence of the Question
A. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
Before 1986, U.S. immigration policy did not contain workplace-spe-
cific restrictions.9 For instance, immigration law did not directly restrict
employers from hiring undocumented workers, and there were no immigra-
tion laws that specifically restricted undocumented workers from working
or accepting work.10 That is not to say, however, that immigration authori-
ties stayed out of the workplace before 1986.11 The key distinction is that
an undocumented worker's act of working and an employer's act of know-
ingly hiring an undocumented worker were not illegal acts under U.S.
immigration law before 1986.12 In 1986, much of this changed when Con-
5. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Immigrant Workers and the Fifth
Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 27.
6. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
7. When I refer to labor and employment law, I am speaking of laws enacted by the
U.S. government, the District of Columbia, or the fifty U.S. states.
8. 1 refer broadly to labor and employment law statutes and common law that pro-
vide some form of workplace right and remedy.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 51-56 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5655-60.
10. See generally id.
11. See, e.g., Gerald M. Boyd, Jackson Describes the Reagan Administration As 'War-
mongering,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1984, at B8 (referring to U.S. immigration officials'
raids of workplaces); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Backs Factory Searches for Illegal
Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1984, at Al (referring to immigration raids of two Los Ange-
les factories).
12. See generally H. R. REP. No. 99-682(1), at 51-56.
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gress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). I 3
Along with amnesty for over one million undocumented immigrants,14 the
IRCA brought workplace-specific restrictions into U.S. immigration pol-
icy. 15 The way in which the IRCA moved immigration enforcement more
intimately into the workplace created mixed messages and, therefore, con-
fusion about whether the IRCA intended to combat illegal immigration by
restricting undocumented workers' access to specific labor and employ-
ment law remedies in the event that employers violated their workplace
rights.
The IRCA contained a number of mixed messages regarding the role of
workplace restrictions in immigration enforcement. First, by both mandat-
ing an employee verification system and establishing civil and criminal
sanctions for employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers, 1 6 the
IRCA made it unlawful for employers to knowingly hire undocumented
workers. 17 Next, in 1990, the IRCA made it unlawful for undocumented
workers to knowingly use fraudulent documents to obtain employment.1 8
Notably, however, the IRCA specifically did not make it unlawful for an
undocumented worker who did not use fraudulent documents to work or
accept employment. Also, the IRCA did not indicate explicitly whether it
would have any effect on the legal remedies available to undocumented
workers who suffered violations of state and federal labor and employment
laws in the workplace. The IRCA's express preemption provision dealt
only with its preemptive effect on state laws sanctioning employers for hir-
ing undocumented immigrant workers. 1 9
B. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB
Given the IRCA's increased restrictions on the actions of undocu-
mented workers in 1990, courts increasingly have faced the question of
whether Congress intended to place additional workplace restrictions on
undocumented workers by reducing their access to certain labor and
employment law remedies that were available to them as a result of their
13. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
14. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Wallace Hendricks, Should 'Agricultural Laborers'
Continue to Be Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 EMORY LJ. 489, 498
n.42 (1999) ("The IRCA permitted the granting of temporary resident status to as many
as 350,000 aliens who could prove they performed agricultural services for at least 90
days between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986."); Editorial, Give Illegal Aliens More Time,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at A24 ("The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
provided amnesty for the estimated 1.4 million to 2 million undocumented aliens who
have been in the United States since before 1982.").
15. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 274A(a)-(d).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b), (e)(4)-(5), (f) (2000).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2000).
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) ("The provisions of this section preempt any state or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar
laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized
aliens."); Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The
statute is silent ... as to its preemptive effect on any other state or local laws.").
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employers' workplace rights violations. 20 The Supreme Court addressed
whether the IRCA affected the remedies available to undocumented work-
ers pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 1 in Hoffman, a
decision that generated additional confusion about the effect of the IRCA
on labor and employment law enforcement in cases involving undocu-
mented workers.
The Hoffman Court held that the National Labor Relations Board
could not grant back pay (lost future earnings) to a worker who had vio-
lated the IRCA by submitting fraudulent documents as a remedy for his
employer's NLRA violation.2 2 This decision created confusion in lower
courts about whether the IRCA similarly affected lost future earnings and
other remedies available to undocumented workers pursuant to both state
laws and federal laws beyond the NLRA. 23 Much scholarship has been
dedicated to addressing these perplexing questions.24 Lower courts grap-
pling with the relationship between immigration enforcement through the
IRCA and labor and employment enforcement at the federal and state level
have arrived at varied results. 2 5
Here I touch on a subset of the post-IRCA and post-Hoffman questions:
Does the IRCA preempt any state labor and employment remedies of lost
future earnings 26 for undocumented workers and if so, when? It is well-
established that the preemption analysis is fundamentally a question of
congressional intent.2 7 Therefore, the underlying question is whether Con-
gress intended the IRCA's workplace restrictions to limit undocumented
20. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 142 n.2 (2002).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006) (regulating collective bargaining and organizing
rights of covered private sector employees).
22. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 140-41. It is important to note that
Hoffman is not a case about whether undocumented workers are covered by the National
Labor Relations Act. There is little doubt that undocumented workers are "employees"
according to the NLRA and therefore have all of the same rights as documented workers.
Instead, Hoffman concerns itself with the remedies available to undocumented workers
once a court has determined that the undocumented workers have suffered an NLRA
violation of their rights. See id. at 142-49.
23. See, e.g., Maria Pab6n L6pez, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United
States Legal System After Hoffman Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and Comparison
with Argentina's Legal System, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 301, 307-14 (2005).
24. See id.; Michael Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 513-17 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 239 n.21 (2d Cir.
2006); Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004).
26. 1 focus on the remedy of lost future earnings, rather than the remedy of rein-
statement, because the lost future earnings remedy is most relevant to the Supreme
Court's Hoffman decision and more often addressed by lower courts facing a preemption
analysis. The reinstatement remedy is much more likely to be preempted by the IRCA,
because a court-ordered reinstatement of an undocumented worker would require an
employer to violate the IRCA by knowingly hiring someone without proper identifica-
tion. See Wishnie, supra note 24, at 505 (finding lost future earnings remedy to be less
"troublesome" in the preemption context and stating that "courts have approved only
those reinstatement orders that are conditioned on an undocumented worker securing
INS work authorization within a reasonable period of time.").
27. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
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workers' access to labor and employment law remedies of lost future earn-
ings at the state level.
In answering this IRCA preemption question, some lower courts fol-
lowing the Hoffman decision have broadened the reach of the Supremacy
Clause. For instance, a Florida district court in Veliz v. Rental Service Corp.
USA, Inc. relied on Hoffman to hold that the IRCA preempted a state tort
law remedy of lost future earnings to an undocumented worker who had
violated the IRCA.28 In arriving at this conclusion, the Veliz court went so
far as to say that "[iun addition to trenching upon the immigration policy of
the United States in condoning prior violations of immigration laws award-
ing lost wages would be tantamount to violating the IRCA."2 9 The court
appears to have reasoned that awarding these types of damages to undocu-
mented workers would be a violation of the IRCA.30 The court, however,
did not cite to a particular provision of the IRCA in making its
determination.3 1
The confusion about the IRCA's effect on undocumented workers'
access to state labor and employment law remedies is also demonstrated by
courts that have a difficult time determining whether a state law remedy of
lost future earnings is preempted (and therefore cannot be provided to an
undocumented worker) in the absence of an IRCA violation. For instance,
in Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Silva, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, noting the difficulty of the determination, found that
the IRCA did not preempt New York State's scaffolding law remedy where
the undocumented worker did not violate the IRCA.3 2
II. Supreme Stretch
As I will describe below, a brief review of general Supremacy Clause
principles and recent Supremacy Clause cases indicates that courts may be
going beyond currently-established Supremacy Clause borders when they
determine that federal immigration policy preempts undocumented work-
ers' access to state labor and employment law remedies of lost future
earnings.
28. 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336-37 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
29. Id. at 1336.
30. Id.
31. See generally id.
32. 469 F.3d 219, 249 (2d Cir. 2006). In a recent New York district court case,
however, the court declined to dismiss plaintiffs lost future earnings claim even though
it appeared that the plaintiff violated the IRCA. See Reis v. Vannatta Realty, 515 F. Supp.
2d 441, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). For another very recent example, see Contreras v. KV
Trucking, Inc., No. 4:04-CV-398, 2007 WL 2777518, at *5-6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2007)
("[Elven if the Defendants did not waive the defense, their motion would still be denied.
'Texas law does not require citizenship or the possession of immigration work authoriza-
tion permits as a prerequisite to recovering damages for lost earning capacity."') (cita-
tion omitted).
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A. Principles Weighing Against Preemption
It would be a "supreme stretch" for courts to find that the IRCA
preempts state labor and employment law remedies of lost future earnings
for undocumented workers because Supremacy Clause principles, estab-
lished by Supreme Court case law, weigh against finding preemption in
these cases. First, courts may be less inclined to find preemption because,
given the delicate balance between state and federal sovereignty, there is a
well-established presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant a
state's police power to regulate the workplace 33 unless it does so explic-
itly.34 With the IRCA, Congress did not expressly state that it intended to
preempt state labor and employment law remedies. 35
Second, courts may be less apt to find preemption in these cases
because legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to pre-
empt state labor and employment law enforcement in any way. The U.S.
House of Representatives committee report issued in conjunction with the
IRCA indicates that the legislation was not meant "to undermine or dimin-
ish in any way labor protections in existing law ... or to limit the powers of
federal or state labor relations boards ... to remedy unfair practices com-
mitted against undocumented employees. '3 6 Even though legislative his-
tory is not explicit evidence of congressional intent, it suggests that courts
may be less inclined to find that the IRCA preempts state law remedies of
lost future earnings in these cases.
Third, courts may be less willing to find preemption in these cases
because it is possible to enforce simultaneously both the state labor and
employment law remedy of lost future earnings and the IRCA. Courts in
general are less inclined to find preemption when state and federal law can
be interpreted in such a way to allow for simultaneous enforcement. If an
employee violates immigration law, the immigration authorities have the
power to bring charges against that employee even if that employee has
33. It is well established that when states regulate workplaces, they act according to
their traditional police powers. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)
("States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment
relationship to protect workers within the State. Child labor laws, minimum and other
wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and safety, and workmen's compensation
laws are only a few examples.").
34. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("In all pre-emption cases...
we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress."') (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
35. See Affordable Hous. Found., 469 F.3d at 231-32 ("From its initial enactment,
IRCA has contained an express preemption clause, stating that '[t]he provisions of this
section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee
for employment, unauthorized aliens.' 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). The statute is silent,
however, as to its preemptive effect on any other state or local laws.").
36. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5662.
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received certain remedies according to state labor and employment law. 37
In other words, an undocumented worker's receipt of lost future earnings
should not prohibit or deter immigration authorities from enforcing the
IRCA. Despite the IRCA, the immigration and labor enforcement regimes
are still separate with respect to which laws govern and who has standing
to bring charges against- whom.38 As long as these separate enforcement
regimes are not in conflict, the courts will be less likely to find that the
IRCA preempts state law remedies of lost future earnings.
B. Case Law Weighing Against Preemption
The IRCA preemption cases are cases of implied conflict preemption.39
Courts find implied conflict preemption "where state law 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."' 40 Therefore, the relevant question in an IRCA
implied conflict preemption case is whether the state labor and employ-
ment law remedy of lost future earnings stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the IRCA's purpose to decrease employment opportuni-
ties for undocumented workers. 4 1 To begin to answer this question, I
review recent Supreme Court jurisprudence where the Court applied
implied conflict preemption analysis, identify the boundaries that these
cases have set on the Supremacy Clause, and then map these boundaries
onto the IRCA preemption context. My review of the IRCA cases reveals
three types of implied preemption cases, which indicate that a finding of
37. It is important to note here, as mentioned above, that the state labor and employ-
ment law remedy of reinstatement is preempted to the extent that it would force employ-
ers to knowingly hire or rehire undocumented workers in violation of the IRCA. Here I
am referring only to state labor and employment law remedies of lost future earnings.
38. For instance, the government brings IRCA cases against allegedly undocumented
persons in immigration court but employees bring state labor and employment law
cases against their employers in state court.
39. The Supreme Court has identified three main types of preemption: (1) express
preemption, (2) field preemption, and (3) implied conflict preemption. See Gade v. Nat'l
Solid Wastes Mgmt., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). As noted above, the situation described
here is not a case of express preemption because the IRCA does not contain any express
language preempting state labor and employment law. See supra note 35 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, this is not a case of field preemption because it cannot be said that
the federal regulatory scheme is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" with state labor and employment
laws that provide lost future earnings remedies regardless of immigration status. See
Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
40. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
41. For statutory language suggesting that this is the IRCA's purpose, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a (2000) and 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(1)-(3) (2000). For further support from lan-
guage in the IRCA's legislative history, see Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469
F.3d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting, in part, legislative history, the court stated that
"[c]onfronting a 'large-scale influx of undocumented aliens,' Congress concluded that
'the most humane, credible and effective way to respond' to the problem was to penalize
those employers who hired illegal aliens . . . . 'Employment is the magnet that attracts
aliens here illegally .... Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this legislation
from hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from entering illegally
or violating their status in search of employment."') (citations omitted).
Cornell International Law Journal
preemption in IRCA cases would stretch the Supremacy Clause beyond the
current boundaries set forth by the Supreme Court.
1. Supreme Stretch Number 1
A finding that the IRCA preempts state labor and employment law
remedies of lost future earnings would stretch the current boundaries of
the Supremacy Clause because these remedies do not directly and substan-
tially affect employment opportunities for undocumented workers. In the
absence of federal government findings indicating a link, it is too indirect
and speculative to state that granting an undocumented worker lost future
earnings under state labor and employment law increases employment
opportunities for undocumented workers. Although it is possible that a
foreign worker might be inspired to immigrate to the United States based
on the possibility of receiving lost future earnings if they successfully sue
their employer, nothing indicates that the likelihood is substantial enough
to imply a congressional intent to preempt state labor and employment law.
There is no indication that Congress intended to reduce incentives for for-
eign workers to come to the United States by reducing workers' access to
labor and employment law remedies. 4 2 Instead, the IRCA's focus is on
reducing employment opportunities by making it more difficult for employ-
ers to hire undocumented workers. For those undocumented workers who
are already in the United States, there are no apparent findings that access
to state labor and employment law remedies of lost future earnings would
create substantial incentives for them to stay in the United States or facili-
tate their access to future employment in the United States.
The case most often cited for the "direct" and "substantial" require-
ment is English v. General Electric Co.4 3 in which the Supreme Court
rejected a similar incentive-based argument: that the availability of a state
tort remedy, which was similar to the federal remedy, would reduce incen-
tives for people to use the federal, procedure because federal law had
stricter time limits than state law.44 In English, a federal nuclear safety
whistle blower law set up remedies for employees who experience retalia-
tion as a result of whistle blowing about safety violations. 4 5 An employee
sued under state tort theory for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and for retaliation resulting from her whistle blowing.46 The company
argued that allowing her to pursue a state tort remedy, which was available
after the time deadline for a similar federal law remedy under the federal
nuclear safety whistle blower law, would reduce the incentives for the whis-
tle blower to bring federal charges and therefore would decrease timely
42. See 8 U.S.C. 1324a; 8 U.S.C. 1324c(a)(1)-(3); H.R. REP. No. 99-682(l), at 46
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650 ("This legislation seeks to close the
back door on illegal immigration so that the front door on legal immigration may
remain open. The principal meaning of closing the back door, or curtailing future ille-
gal immigration, is through employer sanctions.").
43. 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990).
44. Id. at 89-90.
45. Id. at 75-76.
46. Id. at 77.
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reports of nuclear safety. 47 The English Court found these comments
about what motivates people to make a complaint to be too speculative, too
much of a stretch, in this context. 4 8 The Court stated that "[s]uch a pros-
pect is simply too speculative a basis on which to rest a finding of pre-
emption." 49
Similarly, when considering the IRCA preemption cases, in the
absence of any discernable congressional intent or findings, it is too specu-
lative to base a finding of preemption on the assumption that future
undocumented workers will be motivated to immigrate to the United States
because of the potential availability of state labor and employment law rem-
edies if they successfully sue their employers for workplace rights viola-
tions. For undocumented workers who already live in the United States, it
is likewise too speculative to say that their access to labor and employment
law remedies of lost future earnings will affect their access to employment
opportunities in some way. 50 In light of English, these scenarios are simply
too speculative, too much of a stretch, to support a finding of an IRCA
preemption. The connection is simply not direct or substantial enough to
find an IRCA preemption.
2. Supreme Stretch Number 2
The Supreme Court's decision in Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc.5 1 exemplifies a second type of case indicating
that a finding of an IRCA preemption would stretch the Supremacy Clause
beyond its constitutional boundaries. Hillsborough held that federal law
does not preempt state law when the effects are too speculative, the state
law has an effect on an area where there are competing federal goals, and
the federal government has not provided guidance about how to "strike a
balance" between those competing goals.5 2 Therefore, the Hillsborough
case indicates that the IRCA does not preempt state labor and employment
law remedies of lost future earnings because of the amount of speculation
involved and because Congress has not indicated how to address the possi-
ble conflict between its goal in enacting the IRCA, to reduce employment
opportunities to undocumented workers, and its goal to allow states to pro-
mote minimum labor and employment standards through labor and
employment law enforcement. 53
47. See id. at 89.
48. See id. at 90.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704-705 (11th Cir. 1988) ("We
doubt, however, that many illegal aliens come to this country to gain the protection of
our labor laws. Rather it is the hope of getting a job-at any wage-that prompts most
illegal aliens to cross our borders.").
51. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
52. See id. at 721.
53. See, e.g., Gary v. Air Group, Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that
its holding was strengthened by "the well-established principle that 'courts should not
lightly infer preemption.' This is particularly apt in the employment law context which
falls 'squarely within the traditional police powers of the states, and as such should not
be disturbed lightly."') (citations omitted).
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The Hillsborough Court faced the question of whether federal law-
which had an identifiable goal to increase safety and to increase the
amount of blood plasma available nationally-preempted a local law
imposing blood plasma collection requirements that went beyond the
safety requirements established by the federal law.5 4 In an attempt to con-
vince the Court to find preemption of the local law, the plaintiff, Auto-
mated Medical Laboratories, argued that the requirements of the local law
would reduce the number of blood plasma donors nationally, because the
local law's requirements would make it harder for people to donate
blood.55 Therefore, Automated Medical Laboratories reasoned that the
reduction in the number of plasma donors would conflict with the Con-
gressional goal to ensure an adequate supply of plasma nationally.
5 6
The Hillsborough Court considered this argument but was not per-
suaded that the local law would result in a reduction of the blood plasma
supply. Thus, the Court held that the local law was not preempted.5 7 Spe-
cifically, the Court held that Automated Medical Laboratories' concern
that more stringent local regulation would lead to a decrease in donors was
too speculative and therefore did not call for preemption.5 8 The court rea-
soned, for instance, that more stringent safety regulation might lead to an
increase in donors because potential donors would have less fear about
donating.59 Similar to English, Hillsborough demonstrates that it is too
speculative to base a finding of preemption on the assumption that future
undocumented workers will be motivated to immigrate to the United States
because of the potential availability of state labor and employment law.
Moreover, the Hillsborough Court determined that even if the local law
did reduce the blood plasma supply nationally there was no preemption
because neither Congress nor the FDA had affirmatively, "struck a particu-
lar balance between safety and quantity" of blood plasma. 60 Similarly,
under the IRCA, Congress has not struck a balance between the potentially
competing goals of labor and employment law enforcement and immigra-
tion law enforcement. In the absence of clear Congressional intent in the
IRCA context, Hillsborough indicates that courts should not make their
own policy judgments in the IRCA preemption cases.
3. Supreme Stretch Number 3
The third type of Supremacy Clause case demonstrates that a finding
that the IRCA preempts state labor and employment law remedies of lost
future earnings would stretch the Supremacy Clause beyond its constitu-
tional boundaries. Courts hesitate to find preemption in the absence of an
affirmative federal policy statement that federal law dominates a particular
54. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 709-10.
55. See id. at 720.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 720-23.
58. Id. at 720-21.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 721.
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area. In two recent Supreme Court Supremacy Clause cases, for instance,
the difference between finding preemption in one case and finding no pre-
emption in the other was that the circumstances of the latter case lacked
any indication of an affirmative federal policy judgment indicating
preemption. 6 1
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Supreme Court found that
the federal law's detailed and gradual phase-in of varied passive restraint
requirements for car manufacturers, including air bags, seat belts, and
other passive restraints, embodied an affirmative congressional policy
judgment that, at that time, the existence of air bags in every car was not
desirable. 62 The detailed and gradual phase-in contained in the federal
regulations demonstrated enough of an affirmative federal policy judgment
to convince the Court to find preemption. 63 Because allowing their state
tort law claim would present an actual conflict with this affirmative federal
policy judgment, the Court found that the federal regulations preempted
the common law tort action alleging that Honda was negligent in failing to
install air bags in all of its cars.64
In contrast, in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, the Supreme Court found
that federal law did not foreclose a state tort action based on a claim that
boat motor manufacturers had a common law duty to install a propeller
guard on all boat motors. 65 The Sprietsma Court pointed out that the fed-
eral government had previously considered whether to require propeller
guards on boat motors through federal legislation and had decided not to
regulate in this area. 66 According to the Court, the federal government's
silence, even after having considered the propeller guard issue, did not
express an affirmative policy statement one way or another about propeller
guards.6 7 As a result, the state tort law claim was not preempted and was
allowed to move forward.68 Viewed together, these two cases indicate that
courts engaging in an IRCA preemption analysis should not speculate or
create policy in the absence of any indication that Congress intended to
make an affirmative policy statement to forego labor and employment law
remedies of lost future earnings for undocumented workers in order to
achieve some of its immigration law goals.
Conclusion
Recent Supreme Court Supremacy Clause cases indicate that some
lower courts may be stretching the Supremacy Clause beyond its constitu-
tionally-intended boundaries because of the guesswork necessary to decide
61. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 67-68 (2002); Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000).
62. 529 U.S. at 879-81.
63. See id. at 886.
64. See id.
65. See 537 U.S. at 65-66.
66. Id. at 60-62.
67. See id. at 65.
68. See id. at 70.
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the IRCA preemption cases in the absence of any discernible congressional
intent. In finding that the IRCA preempts state labor and employment law
remedies of lost future earnings, these lower courts also threaten to under-
mine the foundation of the labor and employment law enforcement regime.
Judge Walker's statement in his concurring opinion in the Second Circuit's
Silva decision, "Courts should not have to guess how often and to what
extent employers and their illegal alien employees will break the law in
order to decide a case," expresses the difficulty and perhaps impropriety of
asking and answering the types of IRCA Supremacy Clause questions dis-
cussed above. 69 This poignant statement, together with this brief review of
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, demonstrates the merit of and need for a
more extensive review of the Supreme Court's Supremacy Clause jurispru-
dence to understand fully the relationship between federal immigration
policy and state labor and employment law in the IRCA preemption
context.
69. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 254 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Walker, J., concurring).
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